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ABSTRACT 
The Family Violence Councils (FVC) are collaborative settings that bring together 
various organizations involved in the system’s response to family violence (e.g., domestic 
violence shelter programs; law enforcement; courts). FVCs aim to increase coordination 
among member organizations. Social network analysis (SNA) is a technique that allows 
one to assess the connections between members (e.g., agencies) within a particular 
bounded network (i.e., network with a clearly defined set of members; Scott, 1991) and is 
well-suited to the study of councils. SNA has a variety of tools that can be used to assess 
the nature of relationships between members (e.g. organizations); centrality measures 
indicate which members in the network are central and prominent players in the setting. 
The current study applied three centrality measures in five councils to identify consistent 
patterns regarding which organizations tend to be most central in the exchange of 
information among agencies responding to family violence. Identifying consistent central 
organizations may reveal which organizations are critical to engage to facilitate such 
information exchange. Further, the study examined whether centrality was related to the 
degree to which a given organization’s policy and practices were influenced by council 
efforts. The study found domestic violence programs emerged as central organizations in 
four of the five sites, but the pattern was unique in each of the five communities. The 
study also found a relationship between an organization’s centrality and perceived shifts 
in its policy and practices. The implications of these findings for research and practice 
will be discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collaboratives are popular structures formed to address systems change in 
response to various social issues (e.g. domestic violence, child welfare services, juvenile 
delinquency, community health; Berkowitz, 2001). Collaboratives include coordinating 
councils, community-based coalitions, and interagency teams (herein referred to as 
councils; Allen, Watt, & Hess, 2008; Berkowitz, 2001; Wolff, 2001) and typically bring 
together various stakeholders to promote an integrated response to complex issues. 
Frequently, interagency coordination is the specific method encouraged to produce such 
an integrated response across organizational boundaries (Alter, 1990). That is, councils 
encourage multiple organizations to work together as part of a coordinated whole by, for 
example, exchanging information, making referrals to one another, and sharing resources 
(e.g., Foster-Fishman, et al., 1999; Himmelman, 2002). Given the emphasis on 
interagency coordination, Social Network Analysis (SNA) provides a potent tool for 
examining such connectivity.  
The current study explores the use of a specific class of network indices, 
centrality indices, to examine the nature of interagency coordination in the form of 
information exchange, as well as the role that specific organizational types play in 
encouraging such exchange. Specifically, examining centrality turns our attention to the 
specific organizations that function as “bridges” or as “hubs of exchange” in the network 
by connecting otherwise unconnected organizations (Burt, 1995) or being broadly 
connected to others in the network (i.e., degree centrality). Examining centrality can 
provide a picture of the specific roles organizations take within interorganizational 
collaborative networks. Further, the current study examines how various indicators of a 
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given organization’s centrality in the network are related to attributes of the organization 
being influenced by council efforts (in terms of perceived changes in policy and practice). 
Himmelman (2002) provides an important distinction between collaboration and 
coordination as dimensions of interagency relationships. Himmelman argues that 
collaboration falls on a continuum of complexity and commitment – collaboration 
reflects the greatest degree of shared risk and responsibility among organizational 
partners. Coordination is positioned just before collaboration on this continuum. 
Specifically, Himmelman defines coordination as “exchanging information and altering 
activities for mutual benefit and to achieve a common purpose” (Himmelman, 2002, p.2). 
Given the common emphasis on encouraging interagency coordination as one component 
of a collaborative process, one way to understand how councils affect change is to 
examine the specific nature of coordination across organizations and stakeholder groups, 
and to look at the exchange of information among these groups. 
The Case of Family Violence Coordinating  Councils (FVC) 
The current study focused on Family Violence Councils (FVC; herein referred to 
as FVC or councils).  These councils are formed to improve the systems response to 
family violence by encouraging interagency linkages between domestic violence service 
providers and criminal justice agencies, in particular. The FVC are organized by judicial 
circuits in the State. Judicial circuits are regions organized by the State court system and 
typically include multiple counties. Thus, the FVC in the current study have strong ties to 
the judicial system and are typically chaired by Chief Judges of the circuit or their 
appointees. The local FVCs in the circuit get funding and technical assistance from the 
State Family Violence Coordinating Council and its state staff. Each local FVC attempts 
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to engage the various organizations in the circuit (both within and across counties) that 
are involved in the systems response to family violence. These organizations include, for 
example, domestic violence shelters, batterer’s intervention programs, child welfare 
agencies, law enforcement, probation, and courts. As their name would imply, the 
councils aim to increase interagency coordination in their response to family violence.  
In a given circuit, some of the critical responding organizations are active 
members in the council, some are peripherally involved in the council, and some are non-
members, or not actively involved in council efforts. The active member organizations 
may be particularly important for a given local FVCs efforts, because they are likely to be 
better connected with other organizations than are more peripheral members or non-
members (Allen, 2009). Therefore, identifying those agencies within a network that are 
both active and central members in the network may reveal the specific nature of the 
diffusion of new knowledge or innovation throughout the network.  
Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a technique that allows one to assess the 
linkages between members within a particular bounded network (i.e., network with a 
clearly defined set of members; Scott, 1991). SNA is well suited to the study of councils 
because it has a variety of tools that can be used to assess interagency linkages, including, 
for example, information exchanges, and the relationships between members (e.g., 
organizations) in a setting of interest (e.g., councils). One set of tools is the indices of 
network centrality, or metrics that capture the extent to which an actor in the network is 
connected to other actors in the network. 
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Defining network terms.  
A first step in applying SNA is becoming familiar with the specific language used 
to describe networks. To begin, a social network is a set of actors and the relationships 
between them (Koehly & Shivy, 1998). Networks can be a group of friends, a school, or 
the agencies that comprise a system (e.g., criminal justice, human service) or that are 
engaged in a collaborative initiative. Actors can include individuals in a setting such as 
schools, groups in an organization (e.g. student groups in schools), or agencies in a 
system. Ties refer to the connections between the actors, and these can include the 
friendships between individuals, the exchange of information and resources between 
agencies, etc. In this study, settings refer to given networks of councils. Most relevant to 
the current study is the concept of centrality.  
Centrality Measures 
Among those tools relevant to the study of interagency coordination are various 
centrality measures that indicate which members in the network are central and 
prominent players in the network. Centrality is an important structural attribute of social 
networks. It is related to other group properties and processes (Freeman, 1979), 
including, for example, which member in the group has access to more information. 
Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, and Labianca (2009) in a recent review of network theory and 
literature state that a “fundamental axiom” in network research is that an actor’s (or node 
in network language) position in the network determines in part the opportunities and 
constraints the actor encounters, “and in this way plays an important role in a node’s 
outcomes” (p.894). An actor’s power is then a result of the power of all other actors in 
the network, and the actor can be affected by changes in the network far away from it 
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(Borgatti et al., 2009). Thus, the more central an actor is the more powerful or influential 
its position in the network is, or the more central an actor the better positioned it is to be 
influenced by the efforts of the collaborative network. 
The current study will apply a variety of centrality measures across five councils 
to identify consistent patterns regarding which organizations tend to be most central in 
the networks. Identifying central organizations may reveal which organizations need to 
be engaged to most effectively diffuse information and knowledge among such 
organizations. Effective diffusion of information might be integral to increasing requisite 
knowledge among the agencies in these settings, which has been identified as an outcome 
that collaborative settings are well positioned to accomplish (Allen, Watt, & Hess, 2008).  
Centrality can be conceptualized at two levels. One is at the level of the individual 
actor in the network (i.e., node centrality) and the other is at the level of the whole 
network (i.e., network centralization). Node centrality identifies which individual actors 
are the most central in a network. Network centralization is the degree to which one actor 
or node in the network is more central than all other nodes (Freeman, 1979). The current 
study will examine both levels of centrality (actor-level and network-level centrality) in 
the councils’ networks. Even at the level of the individual actor, there are several ways to 
conceptualize centrality, and each actor level conceptualization has a corresponding 
network level conceptualization. An actor being central in a social network suggests that 
it is more connected to other actors in the network and therefore in a more advantageous 
position for outcomes such as access to resources in the network (e.g. information, 
funding opportunities, etc.). A network being more centralized suggests that one 
particular actor is more connected relative to other actors in the network. 
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Actor Centrality 
Degree Centrality.  
The three most common conceptualizations of centrality were described by 
Freeman (1979) in his seminal paper (see Table 1). The first is “degree centrality”. In 
SNA, the degree of a particular actor is the number of other actors s/he is adjacent to or in 
direct contact with (Freeman, 1979). Thus, the degree of an organization would be the 
number of other organizations with whom it directly exchanges information. For 
communication networks, nodes with high degree centrality have high visibility or 
“potential for activity” (Freeman, 1979). Information exchange networks can be 
conceptualized as communication networks. An organization that has high degree 
centrality has access to a lot of direct information because it has direct contact with many 
other organizations. Thus, this organization may be “in the know” by virtue of these ties. 
Degree based network centralization would tell us whether one organization has more 
information exchanges with others compared to all other organizations in the network 
(Freeman, 1979). Figure 1 illustrates the concept of degree centrality in a hypothetical 
network of five organizations. In this figure, Organization A has the highest degree 
centrality because it is the only organization that is directly linked or connected to all 
other organizations in the network. 
In terms of interagency coordination, organizations with high degree centrality 
might be critical for access to information or other resources in the field of interest since 
they are likely to be the most well informed because of their extensive connections and 
relationships with other organizations. To illustrate, in a social network analysis of social 
capital in collaborative planning settings, Mandarano (2007) examined degree centrality 
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as an indicator of each actor’s social capital. Social capital was assessed in terms “of new 
relationships formed, network structures, factors that influenced the formation of new 
social ties, and influence of the structure of the social networks on realizing successful 
outcomes” (p. 246). In this application of centrality, the number of an actor’s ties (or 
contacts with other organizations) serves as an indicator of its relationships with others in 
the setting, and therefore as an indicator of its social capital. The study examined a 
regional collaborative environmental partnership and found that the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) consistently emerged as the central 
organization across different types of exchange networks. In the exchange networks 
where additional organizations were identified as central, these, too, were governmental 
agencies. These findings indicated that governmental agencies were more central in the 
various exchange networks and non-governmental agencies were peripheral by 
comparison. Mandarano (2007) suggests this information can be used to illustrate gaps in 
resource and funds exchange networks to revisit activities to bridge those gaps. If done 
early, this could provide practitioners with specific information to bridge the gap between 
the most distanced stakeholders and other stakeholders. Such an approach could be used 
with the FVCs to identify organizations that have the most access to information in the 
network by means of their extensive connections with others. 
Similarly, Mendel, Damberg, Sorbero, Varda, and Farley (2009), in their study of 
partnerships to support patient safety practice adoption, also examined which agencies 
were central using two different criteria, including degree, in inter-organization 
partnerships to identify key stakeholders that had access to resources. They found that 
government agencies in general tended to be most central in the overall network on 
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measures of centrality. In particular, the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) was located in central positions in the network, which was not 
surprising given that it was the federal agency with the funding resources and the agency 
that initiated the evaluation of organization partnerships to support patient safety. Since 
governmental agencies tend to be central in interagency settings, and are also the 
agencies that tend to have access to funding, they are critical to engage in collaborative 
efforts in such settings. 
Betweenness centrality. 
The second type of centrality that Freeman (1979) describes is “betweenness 
centrality”. The betweenness centrality of a given actor is the frequency with which an 
actor falls in between pairs of other actors on their geodesic distances (i.e., shortest 
distance between two actors). “An [actor] that falls on the communication paths between 
other [actors] exhibits a potential for control of their communication” (Freeman, 1979, 
p.221). An actor that falls on some but not all geodesics connecting a pair of other actors 
has more limited control. For example, if two organizations are linked by only one other, 
the latter organization may have a high level of control over their communication. Actors 
with high betweenness centrality are seen as powerful brokers in a network because they 
have the potential to cut other actors’ information sources (Freeman, 1979). That is, those 
actors are only connected by virtue of their linkage to the actor, or actor(s) “in the 
middle.” However, in the study of councils, another way to think about an organization 
with high betweenness centrality is as an organization that has the potential for bringing 
together organizations that would otherwise not be in contact and therefore as bridges or 
connectors of agencies. Betweenness network centralization then would be an index of 
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the degree to which a particular organization has more power to control information 
exchange than other organizations (Freeman, 1979), or alternatively has more potential to 
transmit information to otherwise unconnected organizations. In Figure 2, the same five 
organizations exist in the network as Figure 1. However, in this network, the various 
organizations are connected to each other by virtue of their links with Organization A. 
Thus, Organization A is connecting other organizations (e.g. Organization B and 
Organization D) that would otherwise have no contact with each other. 
By examining betweenness centrality in collaborative settings, it is possible to 
identify organizations that might serve as “information brokers” that connect various 
stakeholders and therefore increase interagency coordination. For example, Berardo 
(2009) examined the effects of centrality on interagency connections in multi-
organization policy arenas. The policy arenas that were studied were U.S. estuaries. This 
study found that for complex interagency teams, such as the estuary settings, it might be 
more cost effective to increase the connections between various stakeholders through 
other central organizations rather than create a densely connected team overall. The 
estuary settings are similar to the FVC in that they both are created to bring together 
various governmental and non-governmental organizations to address a common concern. 
Many of the organizations in the estuary networks had National Estuary Program (NEP) 
status which meant they received funding to implement coordination efforts, just like 
every FVC network receives funding and technical assistance from the state staff for 
collaboration efforts. Also, just like there were NEP and non-NEP organizations in the 
estuary network, there are member and non-member organizations in the FVC networks. 
Given these similarities, betweeneness centrality may be an important component of 
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efficiency in communication in the FVC networks by creating hubs of information 
exchange. 
In addition to identifying key stakeholders in a setting, one can also examine how 
being located in central positions affects actors in the network or what actors in central 
locations are positioned to do. In their review of network analysis in the social sciences, 
Borgatti and colleagues (2009) found that a firm’s centrality in its network predicted the 
firm’s ability to innovate as well as perform well financially. This might be due to the 
availability of resources to central actors, including the most innovative knowledge in the 
field. “Perhaps the most common mechanism for explaining consequences of social 
network variables is some form of direct transmission from node to node” (p.894). This 
method could be applied to collaborative settings to identify central actors in a setting as 
possible innovators when it comes to designing and implementing collaborative projects. 
Closeness centrality. 
The last notion of centrality Freeman (1979) describes is “closeness centrality”, 
which measures how close an actor is to all other actors (i.e. how many lines does it take 
to connect a given actor to all of the other actors in the network, on average?). It can only 
be calculated on connected networks (i.e., networks where all actors are connected to 
each other and there are no isolates; Freeman, 1979). Closeness centrality is also related 
to control of information but in a different way than betweenness. An actor is central to 
the extent it can avoid being controlled by others because it is so closely connected to 
many organizations and therefore not dependent on any single organization to be linked 
to a network. With closeness centrality, a central position does not have to depend on any 
one actor as a “go between” to relay messages to it since it is well connected to many 
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actors (Freeman, 1979). Freeman (1979) states that the “independence of an [actor] is 
determined by its closeness to all other [actors] in the graph” (p.224). The degree of 
independence of a given actor being dependent on closeness centrality is somewhat 
paradoxical; however, it illustrates the importance of interdependency in networks. In 
order for an organization (Organization A) to be up to date on issues concerning its 
functioning it has to be connected to other organizations in the systems it is involved in. 
The more organizations Organization A is connected with, the more sources of 
information it will have, and the better informed it will be. Organizations that have low 
closeness centrality are in a vulnerable position to not be well informed because they are 
not well connected to other organizations. The organization that is most central using this 
measure is the one to target if one wants to minimize the cost and time for 
communicating to all other points (Freeman, 1979). Figure 3 illustrates this concept with 
the same hypothetical network used in previous examples. Organization A is the most 
closely connected organization in the network because it is the only organization that is 
either one or two ties away from all other organizations in the network (i.e. it either has 
direct contact with another organization or has to go through only one other organization 
to reach another organization). For example, while Organization B has the same number 
of direct contacts as Organization A (i.e., two), Organization A only has to go through 
Organization E to get to Organization D, but Organization B has to go through both 
Organization A and Organization E to get to Organization D. Therefore, Organization A 
is more closely connected than Organization B. Closeness network centralization works 
the same as other network centralizations (i.e., it indexes the degree to which one 
organization is closer to all others). When considering interagency coordination, this is 
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particularly valuable because identifying the central organization that needs to be 
engaged for the timely dissemination of information might be critical for effective 
coordination efforts. This is particularly true when a given organization is critical to the 
effective implementation of a given effort. 
Notably, there are other important contributors to the development of centrality 
measures (e.g., Bonacich 1972; 1987). However, for the current study, only the three 
measures described by Freeman (1979) were examined given the purpose of collaborative 
settings is to increase cooperation and coordination among the various stakeholders they 
bring together (Alter, 1990; Berkowitz, 2001; Allen, Watt, & Hess, 2008). Bonacich’s 
conceptualization seems more appropriate when one is looking at competition and 
bargaining power as well as cooperation. Also, in a review of approaches to centrality, 
Marsden (1990) found that according to one study examining the three Freeman measures 
with Bonacich’s measures in a network, all were positively correlated and that 
betweenness centrality was the least redundant with all others. This is not surprising 
considering that “the range of variation in scores, both for [actor] centrality and [network] 
centrality, is greatest for the indexes based on betweenness; they are ‘finer grained’ 
measures than the others” (Freeman, 1979, p.237). 
Network Centralization 
In addition to actor centrality, one can also examine network centralization to see 
how centralized the network is overall. If overall network centralization is high, then the 
central actors in such networks are critical to engage for information dissemination or 
access to resources as central actors. If network centralization is low, such truly “central” 
actors would not be present. For example, Mendel and colleagues (2009), in addition to 
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identifying Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) as central in 
partnerships supporting patient safety adoption, found that network centralization 
increased in over time. This highlights AHRQ’s critical role, but also suggests that timely 
dissemination of information and practices is highly dependent on AHRQ. The authors 
suggest that: 
In a highly centralized network, these central hubs represent single points of 
failure, which, if removed or damaged, quickly fragment the network into 
unconnected subnetworks. A less centralized network has fewer points of failure 
and exhibits greater resilience. At the same time, network centralization, like 
density, is associated with faster diffusion of innovations. Thus, although a 
centralized network is more efficient, it may be more prone to failure and less 
empowering to average members (p.722).  
So, although being central in a highly centralized network might be beneficial for the 
individual central organization, it might be viewed as less empowering for the other 
organizations and might make coordinated efforts vulnerable to failure because of their 
central dependence on a given organization. Network analysis measures, such as actor 
and network centrality, can be used to see which organizations are central players in the 
network for the dissemination of information and innovation, but we can also use these 
measures to identify weaknesses in the structure. For example, if a given network is 
found to have high overall network centralization, it might be overly dependent on its 
central actors for information exchange and other coordination activities. However, to the 
extent central organizations are stable and committed to the work of FVCs, such 
centrality may be more of a strength than a liability. Examining network centralization in 
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conjunction with actor centralization can inform interagency efforts by highlighting 
structural strengths and weaknesses, which partners need to be more fully engaged, how 
positions need to be reconfigured to enhance communication or reduce vulnerability, and 
which actors are currently central and thus critical to engage in new efforts. 
 Centrality and council influence. 
It is also important to understand how centrality relates to the degree to which 
given organizations are affected by council efforts to produce change. That is, how likely 
an organization is to benefit from collaboration may depend on its position in the 
collaborative network (Borgatti et al., 2009). FVCs are particularly concerned with 
stimulating policy and practice changes in the network of organizations responding to 
family violence. This follows an emphasis on producing changes “in the text” that govern 
the response of front-line providers (Pence, 1999). The extent to which an organization is 
centrally located in a network may make it more susceptible to influence via council 
efforts. That is, the organizations that are centrally located, and thus have access to 
information and resources in the network (Freeman, 1979), are better poised to make 
informed changes to their policy and practice in response to FVC efforts. Those that are 
less central may be less subject to influence because they are not well connected to the 
core of information exchange occurring in the network. Further, different types of 
centrality may function differently in relationship to organizational change in policy and 
practice.  
Current Study 
The current study, therefore, examines three actor and network centralities (i.e. 
degree, betweenness, and closeness) in the information exchange networks of five Family 
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Violence Councils to identify the overall pattern of the exchange networks (i.e., network 
centralization) and the key players in those patterns (i.e., actor centrality). While 
exchange of information is a key aspect of coordination, very few studies have examined 
which organizations, or organization types, are central in information exchange networks 
among the member organizations of collaborative settings. By identifying possible 
organizations that are key players in information exchange networks, the current study 
aims to identify organizations that are critical to engage for effective diffusion of 
knowledge and coordination efforts in collaborative settings, such as Family Violence 
Councils. Further, although previous studies have utilized one or more types of centrality 
in their methods, no study to date has looked at the three primary types of centrality (i.e. 
degree, betweenness, and closeness) in information exchange networks in the same 
setting and across five such settings. The comparison of multiple settings within the 
current study allows for greater generalizability, while the use of multiple measures of 
centrality yields results that have the potential to lead to a more nuanced understanding of 
information exchange and the role of centrality in collaborative settings.  
Finally, the current study examines how centrality is related to the extent to which 
given organizations have been influenced (in terms of perceived change in policy and 
practice) by FVC efforts. Given the goal of councils to facilitate such organizational 
change, the current study examined the relationship between centrality and peer-ratings 
of an organization’s shifts in practice and policy as a result of council efforts. This allows 
for an examination of the extent to which centrality – in its different forms – is related to 
the degree to which organizations are affected by the systems change work of FVCs. 
Research Questions 
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The current study examines four questions. First, which organizations emerge as central 
in FVCs (e.g., domestic violence programs, law enforcement, courts)? Second, do 
different organizations emerge as central using the different criteria for centrality? Third, 
to what extent are there differences across sites when looking at centrality? Lastly, is 
centrality related to the extent to which organization’s policies and practices are affected 
by council efforts?  
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METHODS 
The current study was part of a larger study on the FVCs in the state. For this 
study, five representative and exemplar local FVCs from the state were chosen. These 
sites were chosen based on (a) geographic representativeness (i.e., different locations 
throughout the state; with different compositions in terms of urban, suburban and rural 
counties), (b) structural make-up (FVCs vary in terms of their subcommittee structure 
being aligned with substantive issues, like law enforcement response, that are circuit wide 
and span multiple counties or subcommittees that focus on the response to family 
violence within given counties), and (c) being generally viewed as settings that have had 
some important successes. General descriptive information about the five circuits 
examined in this study is presented in Table 2. Since the network survey was only sent to 
members of local FVCs, only member response rates could be calculated (i.e., 
nonmember response rates were zero, by design). However, to reflect a complete network 
for a given FVC (i.e., one that had all of the key responding agencies), network rosters 
had both member and non-member organizations on them (see below). Member response 
rate was calculated by dividing the number of responding organizations by the number of 
member organizations on the network roster. For the five sites examined in this study, 
member response rates ranged from 42.4% to 70.6%. This is a typical range for survey 
data gathered via mail (see Anseel, Lievens, Schollaert, & Choragwicka, 2010).  
Network Bounding 
To conduct network analysis a variety of methodological decisions must be made. 
The first of these is how to “bound” the network, or choose which actors should be 
included in the network roster. Each judicial circuit constituted a separate and unique 
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network of organizations responding to intimate partner violence, including organizations 
at the Circuit (i.e., courts, domestic violence shelter programs), County (sheriff’s office, 
state’s attorney) and Local (e.g., municipal police, local agencies) levels. For the purpose 
of this study, in a given Circuit all domestic violence programs (DV), batterer’s 
intervention programs (BI), courts (C), probation departments (P), sheriff’s offices (LE), 
State’s Attorneys (SA), and police departments (LE) were included.1  It is important to 
note that in each Circuit, not all relevant agencies were current council members or 
affiliates. Thus, the network list (or roster) used to survey potential affiliates within each 
Circuit was formed in a two-stage process. First, all relevant agencies that were included 
in councils’ membership lists were included on the survey roster. Second, any agencies 
not included as council affiliates, but that played a role in the criminal justice response to 
intimate partner violence were added (e.g., circuit clerk, states attorney). Resultant 
network survey rosters included all agencies that could be involved in a coordinated 
response to intimate partner violence, some of which were members and some of which 
had no council affiliation (i.e., non-members). Even though only committee member 
agencies were asked to respond to the survey, the inclusion of both member and non-
member agencies’ names on the network roster was useful given the aim was to assess 
member organizations’ connections with one another and with non-member agencies 
within their Circuit networks. This allowed us to begin to establish patterns of interaction 
among the full network of responders and to examine their exchange of information in 
                                                 
1
 For circuits that were large and had numerous police departments, a random sample of departments was 
included in its netweor roster.  This was important because we wanted to ensure that at least one city police 
department was included in the network list for each county in a judicial circuit.  Therefore, we compiled a 
list of all city police departments for each county of each circuit.  For each county, we used a random 
number generator to pick one random city police department that was not part of council membership.  In 
most cases, this resulted in adding as many random police departments as there were counties in a Circuit.  
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light of council membership.   
Measures 
Exchange of information.  
Members were surveyed regarding their contact with all of the agencies identified 
as part of the network. Specifically, respondents were asked to report how often they 
exchanged information with each organization in their Circuit’s network list (using a six-
point Likert-type scale; 1 = Never, 2 = Once/year, 3 = Twice/year, 4 = Monthly, 5 = 
Weekly, 6 = Daily; these value were recoded from 0 to 5 for all subsequent network 
analyses). Respondents also had the option of checking a “NO knowledge of, contact 
with or opinions about” box for each organization. Each organization was listed in a 
separate row on the survey, and respondents considered the full set of ties for each 
organization listed in the network roster. The membership status of organizations was not 
indicated in the roster. If a respondent had checked the “NO knowledge of, contact with 
or opinions about” box for an organization, the exchange of information tie was coded as 
“never.”   
Peer ratings of organizational change as a result of council efforts.  
For each organization in the roster, respondents were also asked to rate the degree 
to which they perceived that membership in the Council had (a) changed policy and 
procedure within the organization and (b) changed the practices of the organization 
(using a four-point Liker-type scale; 1 = not at all, 4 = a lot, and 7 = Don’t know). If a 
respondent had checked the “NO knowledge of, contact with or opinions about” box for 
an organization, the two perceptual variables (i.e., changes in policy and procedure and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Using random sampling in this fashion was critical given that some network lists would be unduly large if 
all non-member municipal law enforcement agencies were included. 
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changes in practices) were coded as missing. Thus, the resultant score is a peer rating, 
generated by respondents who have at least some contact or knowledge of the target 
agency. 
Member status. 
A membership variable was created with 1 = member and 0 = non member, and 
each organization was categorized on this variable. This variable was created to include 
in subsequent regression analyses, given that an organization’s membership in an FVC 
makes it more susceptible to influence by the FVC when compared to non-members. 
Sector. 
A sector variable was created to indicate which system (or sector) in the response 
to intimate partner violence an organization belonged to. The possible values for this 
variable were 1 = domestic violence (DV) program, 2 = batterer’s intervention program, 
3 = law enforcement, 4 = court, 5 = probation, 6 = state’s attorney, and 7 = Department of 
Children and Family Services (DCFS). Each organization was categorized on this 
variable. After the initial categorization, the sector variable was recoded into six dummy 
coded variables with domestic violence program being the referent group. 
Procedures 
Responses regarding the exchange of information across agencies were used to 
calculate the three different types of node centrality (i.e., degree, betweenness, and 
closeness) and the corresponding overall network centralization for each council. 
Network tie data were gathered at the level of individual council members, who 
responded as representatives of their respective agencies. To form a network matrix at the 
organizational level, the individual member-level database was aggregated to the 
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organizational level. If a single organization had more than one respondent, then the 
mean score of multiple respondents’ scores within that organization was used to compute 
one score for the whole organization. In the aggregate network matrix, a row was 
included for each organization on the survey roster, including organizations from which 
we did not receive a survey response. 
Analyses 
UCINET software was used for all social network analyses. The exchange 
information aggregate network matrix for each circuit was uploaded to UCINET. Given 
that social network analysis software requires a complete matrix (i.e., a perfect square 
matrix of actors X actors), missing data were replaced with 0s (“no tie”). This assumes no 
contact between a given non-responding organization (member or nonmember) and all 
others. However, in subsequent steps we used unconfirmed ties (i.e., where contact 
between two agencies is established if either one reports a connection; so if a survey 
respondent indicated having a tie with a survey nonrespondent, then we took the 
respondent’s word that a tie existed). By using unconfirmed ties, we were able to 
establish ties involving agencies for whom no one responded but about whom other 
agencies responded (i.e., a domestic violence shelter program may indicate contact with a 
given law enforcement agency even though no one responded from the law enforcement 
agency). Thus, exchanges were indicated based on either organization in a given dyad 
indicating they had contact.2 Thus, in situations where no data were available contact 
could be established based on the report of only one organization within a given dyad. 
                                                 
2
 For example, person 1 from Organization A reports exchange of information with Organization B.  
However, person 2 from Organization B indicates no contact with Organization A.  To reflect the most 
comprehensive exchange of information between Organization A and B, one has to consider person 1’s 
 22 
To calculate unconfirmed ties, the matrix was made symmetric using the 
maximum of the two data points generated by any two organizations within the network. 
The matrix was also made dichotomous so that ties indicating any contact (i.e., at least 
annual contact) received a “1” and no contact received a “0.” To calculate Freeman’s 
centrality measures on networks, the ties have to be dichotomous. Once the symmetric 
and dichotomous matrices for each council were uploaded to UCINET, the three 
centrality measures were calculated for each council’s network. For those networks that 
had isolates (i.e., organizations that had no connections with any other organizations in 
their network), just the connected network was extracted from the overall network to 
measure closeness centrality since this measure of centrality can only be calculated on 
connected networks. In UCINET, there is a function to extract the main component from 
any matrix (i.e. only the connected network, excluding the isolates). Once the main 
component is extracted, closeness centrality can be indexed on that network. The other 
two indices of centrality (i.e., degree and betweenness) were calculated on the full 
network for each council. The three corresponding network centralization indices for 
each type of point centrality were also calculated on each of the five sites. Network 
centralization, as explained above, is the extent to which one actor is more central than all 
other actors in the network. It is calculated by taking the “differences between the 
centrality scores of the most central point and those of all other points” and it is expressed 
as a ratio (or percent) of “the actual sum of differences to the maximum possible sum of 
differences” (Scott, 1991, p.93). Network centralization can vary from 0 to 1 (or 0 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconfirmed tie.  This is a common approach when key informants are utilized to establish ties between 
agencies (see Foster-Fishman, Salem, et al., 2001 for an application of this approach). 
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100%) for all three types of network centralization, with values closer to 1 or 100% 
indicating highly centralized networks. 
Regression analyses were done to see the relationship between the centrality 
measures and the two perceptual measures regarding perceived changes in policy and 
procedure and perceived changes in practice due to membership in the council, while 
controlling for the effects of the circuit size on centrality. To control for circuit size, four 
dummy coded variables were created for circuit A – circuit D, with Circuit E being the 
referent group. These four dummy variables were entered in all regression analyses as 
control variables. Eight separate hierarchical regression analyses were done. Six of these 
had an organization’s membership status and the four dummy coded circuit variables as 
control variables, one of the centrality measures (i.e. degree, betweenness, and closeness) 
as predictor variables, and one of the perceptual variables (i.e. perceived changes in 
policy and procedure and perceived changes in practice) as a criterion variable. The other 
two hierarchical regression analyses had an organization’s membership status and the 
four dummy coded circuit variables as control variables, all three centrality measures as 
predictor variables, and one of the perceptual variables as a criterion variable. 
Additionally, three more hierarchical regression analyses were done to see if there was a 
relationship between organization type (i.e., sector) and centrality. For these analyses, the 
four dummy coded circuit variables were the control variables, the six dummy coded 
sector variables were the predictor variables, and one of the centrality measures (i.e., 
degree, betweenness, and closeness) was the criterion variable. 
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RESULTS 
Freeman’s Degree Centrality 
Freeman’s degree centrality and corresponding network centralization were 
calculated on the complete network across all five circuits. The three most central 
organizations in each circuit along with the circuit’s overall network centralization are 
given in Table 3. As can be seen from the table, a Domestic Violence Program emerged 
as a central organization in all sites except Circuit B, indicating that in most Circuits, 
Domestic Violence Programs tended to have more direct connections with other 
organizations in their networks. However, it is important to note that Domestic Violence 
Programs were not the most central organizations in every circuit. Law enforcement 
organizations, namely Local Police Departments, State Police, and County Sheriff’s 
Departments, were also highly central. Circuit E and Circuit B were more highly 
centralized networks than the others, indicating that the central organizations in these 
networks might be more critical to target for access to information, compared to the 
central organizations in the other, more diffusely-connected networks. 
Freeman’s Betweenness Centrality 
For Freeman’s betweenness centrality and corresponding network centralization, 
again the complete network was examined for the five circuits and the results are given in 
Table 4. Most of the same organizations emerged as central using the betweenness index 
as those using the degree centrality index. It is important to note that more Domestic 
Violence Programs emerged as central using the betweenness index than the degree 
index, indicating that Domestic Violence Programs are even more important as bridges 
between otherwise unconnected organizations in the network. However, Domestic 
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Violence Programs are still not central in Circuit B. Another important contrast between 
the two tables involves the network centralization rates. The networks are not as highly 
centralized using the betweenness index as they are using the degree index, which might 
indicate that while Domestic Violence Programs are important “connectors”, they are not 
the only bridges between unconnected organizations. Other organizations might also be 
serving as important links in the network, such as law enforcement agencies and County 
Probation Departments. 
Freeman’s Closeness Centrality 
Circuit D had isolates (i.e., organizations that were not connected to any other 
organizations in the network) in its network, and therefore the closeness centrality could 
not be calculated for its complete network. Therefore, the main component, or the 
connected network, was extracted from the complete network and the closeness centrality 
analyses were only done on the main component for Circuit D. For the other four circuits, 
the closeness centrality analyses were done on the complete network, and the results are 
presented in Table 5. Again, the only change between the degree centrality table and the 
closeness centrality table is in favor of a Domestic Violence Program, illustrating that 
Domestic Violence Programs are also closely connected, in addition to being connected 
to many other organizations in their networks. This phenomenon is a result of the strong 
correlation between the various types of centrality in this sample, and suggests that even 
though other organizations might have to rely on Domestic Violence Programs for access 
to information in their networks, Domestic Violence Programs are fairly independent 
(i.e., they do not have to rely on others for information). Because Domestic Violence 
Programs have close ties to many different organizations, they do not have to rely on any 
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one particular organization for information, thus making them less vulnerable to being 
cut-off from access to information. For the overall network centralization, only Circuit E 
was highly centralized with others being more moderately centralized networks. In this 
circuit, the county criminal justice agencies, namely County Sheriff’s Office and County 
Judiciary, were also highly central in addition to a Domestic Violence Program. 
 A series of regression analyses were also conducted to see the links between 
centrality and council efforts, namely perceived shifts in policy and practices. Six 
regression analyses had membership status and circuit as control variables, one of the 
centrality measures (i.e. degree, betweenness, and closeness) as the predictor variable, 
and one of the perceptual variables (i.e. perceived changes in policy and procedure and 
perceived changes in practices) as the outcome or criterion variable. Two additional 
analyses were done where all the centrality measures were entered at once as the 
predictor variables for each of the outcome variables. The results of the regression 
analyses are presented in Tables 6 – 13. The correlations between the predictor variables 
are presented in Table 14. All regression analyses were significant (p < 0.01), even after 
controlling for circuit size and membership. For analyses with peer-ratings of changes in 
policy and procedures as the criterion variable, the degree centrality coefficient (β = .308, 
t(292) = 5.151, p = .000),  the betweenness centrality coefficient (β = .154, t(292) = 
3.124, p = .002), and the closeness centrality coefficient (β = .365, t(291) = 6.229, p = 
.000) were all significant. However, when all three centrality measures were entered 
together as predictor variables, only closeness centrality was significant (β = .594, t(291) 
= 3.727, p = .000). Similarly, degree centrality (β = .298, t(292) = 4.935, p = .000), 
betweenness centrality (β = .140, t(292) = 2.815, p = .005), and closeness centrality (β = 
 27 
.355, t(291) = 5.982, p = .000) were significant predictors of peer-ratings of changes in 
practices after controlling for membership status and circuit size. But again, only 
closeness centrality was a significant predictor of perceived changes in practice (β = .588, 
t(291) = 3.654, p = .000) among the three centrality indices when all three were entered 
simultaneously. The probable reason for degree centrality and betweenness centrality no 
longer being significant predictors of the outcome variables when examined concurrently 
with closeness centrality is the high correlation between the three centrality indices. 
When all three are examined simultaneously, only the centrality index accounting for the 
most variance (i.e., closeness centrality) emerges as a significant predictor. The 
implications of the high correlation between the centrality indices are discussed below. 
To examine whether a particular organization type (i.e., sector) was more likely to 
be central, three hierarchical regression analyses were done with dummy coded circuit 
variables as control variables, dummy coded sector variables as the predictor variables, 
and each of the three centrality indices as the criterion variable (see Tables 15 – 17). For 
degree centrality and closeness centrality, four of the six sector regression coefficients 
were significant. Except for State’s Attorney and DCFS, all the other sectors were 
significantly less likely to be central using these two indices than domestic violence 
programs (i.e., the referent group). For betweenness centrality, only the DCFS coefficient 
was not significant, meaning all the other sectors were less likely to be central than 
domestic violence programs. One of the reasons that DCFS and State’s Attorney 
comparisons with domestic violence are not significant might be that there are 
significantly fewer organizations in these two sectors than in the domestic violence 
program sector. For example, every circuit only has one DCFS, making the total number 
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of DCFS agencies in the sample five. Therefore, even if only one DCFS agency emerged 
as central in the sample (i.e., Circuit D), then DCFS is disproportionately represented as 
central in the sample. These results indicate that, overall, domestic violence programs are 
more likely to be central players in Family Violence Councils. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to explore what organization types emerged as 
central in Family Violence Councils (FVCs), and to examine whether centrality was 
related to the extent to which council efforts affected change in organizational policy and 
practice. Identifying central organizations in collaborative settings is important because 
these organizations might be especially integral to coordination efforts by nature of their 
extensive connections to other organizations in the network. This study was the first to 
examine three different measures of centrality in a collaborative network and compare 
them across five networks and explored which types of organizations are central and 
prominent in one type of collaborative setting, Family Violence Councils. 
Domestic Violence Programs emerged as central actors using all three criteria of 
centrality in all but one network. Previous research has found that governmental 
organizations tend to be central in collaborative initiatives (Mandarano, 2007; Mendel et 
al., 2009). However, the prominence of Domestic Violence Programs relative to 
governmental agencies may be explained by the agenda of FVCs. The agenda of FVCs is 
one that Domestic Violence Programs are invested in and might even be driving. 
Therefore, Domestic Violence Programs are highly involved in the councils and pursue 
ties in the council and impose themselves as central in the network to drive the council’s 
agenda. This might then position them as change brokers to the extent they are viewed as 
legitimate players and experts on family violence. So, it might be the agencies that are 
highly invested in the agenda of the collaborative initiative that emerge as central and 
prominent players in the setting because of the active role they play in bringing other 
stakeholders together to respond to specific cases of domestic violence and to build 
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interagency relationships to improve the response to domestic violence cases more 
generally. This reasoning supports previous research. For example, Mandaro (2007) 
found that the US EPA was a highly central organization in estuary networks. This may 
be because the EPA is highly invested in the environmental agenda of the network. The 
highly invested and central organizations in a setting are the ones that collaborative 
initiatives should target for coordination efforts, such as access to information and 
resources, since these are the organizations that have extensive ties to other organizations 
in the network or are willing to take the time and effort to build those ties if they are not 
initially present.  
While being highly central, Domestic Violence Programs are not the only 
prominent organizations in councils. Criminal justice agencies, especially law 
enforcement agencies, are also central and prominent players in FVCs. This finding 
supports previous research regarding the prominence of governmental agencies, such as 
law enforcement agencies, in collaborative settings (Mandarano, 2007; Mendel et al., 
2009). Even if other types of agencies (i.e. Domestic Violence Programs) are highly 
central in a collaborative setting, governmental agencies are still important to involve in 
coordination efforts for systems response to complex issues. This may be due to the 
access to resources, such as funding, that government agencies have or it may be due to 
the necessity of involving government agencies for certain purposes (e.g. legal recourse 
for family violence). In particular, law enforcement agencies might be central due to their 
formal role as responders to family violence. By virtue of their work, many law 
enforcement agencies have to come into contact with other organizations when 
responding to family violence (e.g. Domestic Violence Programs, DCFS, courts, etc.). 
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Because of their formal and important role in the response to family violence, law 
enforcement agencies are often the target of systems change efforts. The position of law 
enforcement as central in a given network of responders may bode well for being able to 
leverage change. While domestic violence programs may have strong relationships with 
other stakeholders, law enforcement agencies may be viewed as organizational “insiders” 
by other criminal justice agencies. Their investment and centrality in a given network 
may suggest that they are poised to be an influential player to advance FVC efforts by 
bringing along their “peer” agencies (i.e., other law enforcement).  
A surprising finding, and exception to either Domestic Violence Programs or 
criminal justice agencies being central, was the emergence of Department of Child and 
Family Services (DCFS) as central using all three criteria of centrality in Circuit D, as 
well as the DCFS regression coefficient being the only one that was not significant in the 
sector comparisons with domestic violence in all three regression analyses. One possible 
explanation for this is the vast area that Circuit D encompasses (as evident by the square 
miles listed in Table 2). Due to the vast size of the circuit, regional organizations, such as 
DCFS, might be the only organizations that formally serve numerous counties, and 
therefore are connected to organizations across counties, because their work mandates 
them to do so. This might also be true of the State Police, as a particularly central law 
enforcement agency given that they generally cover a broader region than any given 
township or city agency and often provide support to smaller law enforcement units. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the centrality of organizations in a given network was 
related to the perceived influence of council efforts on policy and practice. Degree, 
betweenness, and closeness centrality were related to peer-ratings of the impact of 
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council on changes in policy and practices. These three measures of centrality were 
linked to council efforts above and beyond the agency being a member of the council. So, 
while members of the council might be perceived has having greater shifts in their policy 
and practices relating to family violence, the extent to which these organizations are 
connected is also related to their being perceived as influenced by council efforts. This is 
further indication of centrality being an important attribute of networks because it might 
not only indicate which organizations to target for coordination efforts but also indicate 
that having a central position in a network makes organizations more poised for influence 
by FVC. However, it is important to note that when all three measures of centrality were 
examined simultaneously, only closeness centrality still predicted outcomes of interest, 
likely due to the high collinearity between the three centrality indices (see discussion 
below). This means that closeness (rather than degree or betweenness) may be the active 
ingredient in the centrality findings. That is, the key is not how many contacts an 
organization has, nor whether it is a bridge between contacts, but rather how close it is to 
all other members, on average. Conceptually, closeness is the index that would be used to 
capture how quickly contagious disease spreads from one person to all others in the 
network, because high closeness means the fewest steps from the focal actor to all other 
actors in the network. Thus future research on coordination in FVCs might consider 
conceptualizing centrality not only in terms of social capital (number of contacts or 
bridging/brokering), but also in terms of closeness--i.e., the network structural position 
that suggests quicker access to information from all others in the network, and perhaps 
quicker influence to all others in the network, on average. 
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There were certain limitations in this study. First, the study used organization 
informants’ self-report regarding information exchanges with each other. Such self-report 
might be susceptible to self-presentation bias (i.e. respondents report more ties than 
actually exist to portray their organizations in a positive light) and assumes that a 
respondent’s memory regarding her or his information exchanges with another 
organization is accurate. Future studies should use more objective measures of exchanges 
between organizations (e.g. paperwork regarding contacts between organizations) and 
compare those to self-reports of exchanges to see if the same network structure emerges 
using both types of information. A second limitation in the study is the high correlation 
between all three centrality indices (degree and betweenness: r = 0.749; degree and 
closeness: r = 0.948; betweenness and closeness: r = 0.711). Correlations as high as these 
indicate that the three might not be separate constructs. All three indices were still 
included in all analyses because conceptually they represent different phenomenon (i.e. 
degree centrality represents how vast an organization’s direct contacts are, betweenness 
centrality indicates an organization’s potential to be an information broker, and closeness 
centrality is how closely an organization is linked with others), and therefore the 
implications for a network and its organizations might be different using the different 
criteria. However, given the high correlation between the three, future studies interested 
in examining different measures of centrality in the same networks should look at the 
correlation between their centrality scores and if they are high, should consider choosing 
the measure most relevant to their outcome of interest. 
This study examined what organization types emerged as central in five Family 
Violence Councils using three different criteria of centrality, namely degree, 
 34 
betweenness, and closeness centrality. Domestic violence programs emerged as central 
organizations in four settings, which is not surprising given their investment in the 
agenda of the FVCs and therefore their involvement in the councils to shape the agenda. 
In addition to domestic violence programs, law enforcement agencies also emerged as 
central in the networks. This may be due to the formal role of law enforcement agencies 
in the response to family violence, which by its very nature requires them to contact and 
work with other organizations (e.g. courts, probation, DCFS). In especially large circuits, 
regional agencies, such as DCFS and State Police, were also central and it was 
hypothesized that this may be because such agencies are the only organizations that 
formally serve multiple counties, and therefore have connections with organizations 
across county boundaries. The study also found that centrality was positively related to 
perceived influence of council efforts on policy and practices; that is, organizations that 
were more central were also perceived as having the council impact changes in their 
policy and practices. Future research should examine centrality in collaborative networks 
longitudinally and see if the overall network becomes more centralized over time and 
how the overall network centralization is related to the goals of the collaborative, such as 
increased coordination. Examining collaborative networks longitudinally would also 
allow one to see if the same organization types remain central as the collaborative 
matures. For example, organizations that are providing the funding for the collaborative 
might be more central during its formation. However, once the collaborative has matured, 
other more direct service or advocacy agencies that are seen as experts in the field might 
become more central. Such examination could help us further understand if the same 
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organization types remain prominent players in collaborative settings, and therefore are 
important to target for change efforts.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Definition of Three Centrality Indices 
 
Centrality Definition Formula 
Degree Number of other actors 
a particular actor is 
directly connected to 
               n 
CD(pk) = ∑ a (pi, pk) 
               i=1 
a (pi, pk) = 1 if and only if pi  and pk 
connected by a line; 0 otherwise 
Betweenness Frequency with which 
an actor falls in 
between pairs of other 
actors on their geodesic 
(i.e., path of shortest 
distance between any 
two actors) 
               n   n   
CB(pk) = ∑  ∑    gij(pk) 
               i <  j        gij 
gij = number of geodesics linking pi and pj 
gij(pk) = number of geodesics linking pi 
and pj that contain pk  
i ≠ j ≠ k 
Closeness The number of social 
steps (ties) it takes, on 
average, to connect a 
given actor to all other 
actors in the network 
             ______1______ 
               n 
CD(pk) = ∑  d (pi, pk) 
               i=1 
d (pi, pk) = the number of edges in the 
geodesic linking pi  and pk 
Note. Formulas adapted from “Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification,” 
by L. C. Freeman, 1979, Social Networks, 1, p. 220 – 225.  
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Table 2 
Description of Circuits 
Site Square Miles Number of Counties Council Structure 
Circuit A 1,123 2 Primarily focused 
on one county 
Circuit B 3,946 6 Circuit wide 
Circuit C 1,482 3 Mix of circuit and 
county level 
organization 
Circuit D 4,812 12 Circuit wide 
Circuit E 5,446 9 Circuit wide 
 
 
Table 3 
Degree Centrality and Network Centralization 
Site 1
st
 central 
organization 
2nd central 
organization 
3rd central 
organization 
Network 
Centralization 
Circuit A Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Probation 
department 
Police 
department 
43.08% 
Circuit B State Police Police 
department 
State’s 
Attorney’s 
Office 
60.72% 
Circuit C Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Judiciary/Courts 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
48.22% 
Circuit D Department of 
Child and 
Family Services 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Sheriff’s Office 
53.08% 
Circuit E County Sheriff’s 
Office 
County 
Judiciary/Courts 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
65.24% 
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Table 4 
Betweenness Centrality and Network Centralization 
Site 1
st
 central 
organization 
2nd central 
organization 
3rd central 
organization 
Network 
Centralization 
Circuit A Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Probation 
department 
Police 
department 
32.36% 
Circuit B Police 
department 
State Police State’s 
Attorney’s 
Office 
28.60% 
Circuit C Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
20.49% 
Circuit D Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
Department of 
Child and Family 
Services 
County 
Probation 
Department 
31.22% 
Circuit E County Sheriff’s 
Office 
County 
Judiciary/Courts 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
20.69% 
 
 
Table 5 
Closeness Centrality and Network Centralization 
Site 1
st
 central 
organization 
2nd central 
organization 
3rd central 
organization 
Network 
Centralization 
Circuit A Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Probation 
department 
Police 
department 
43.53% 
Circuit B State Police Police 
department 
State’s 
Attorney’s 
Office 
53.27% 
Circuit C Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
County 
Judiciary/Courts 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
46.89% 
Circuit D Department of 
Child and 
Family Services 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
52.22% 
Circuit E County Sheriff’s 
Office 
County 
Judiciary/Courts 
Domestic 
Violence 
Program 
61.26% 
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Table 6 
Degree Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Policy and Procedure 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.461 0.044  1.422 0.043  
Member 0.258 0.038 0.340** 0.139 0.044 0.182** 
Circuit A -0.175 0.072 -0.127* -0.305 0.073 -0.221** 
Circuit B -0.418 0.053 -0.481** -0.421 0.051 -0.486** 
Circuit C -0.098 0.063 -0.084 -0.139 0.061 -0.119* 
Circuit D -0.185 0.048 -0.223** -0.128 0.048 -0.155** 
Degree     0.007 0.001 0.308** 
R2  0.363   0.417  
Change in R2  0.363**   0.054**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 7 
Betweenness Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Policy and Procedure 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.461 0.044  1.473 0.044  
Member 0.258 0.038 0.340** 0.219 0.040 0.288** 
Circuit A -0.175 0.072 -0.127* -0.196 0.071 -0.142** 
Circuit B -0.418 0.053 -0.481** -0.436 0.052 -0.502** 
Circuit C -0.098 0.063 -0.084 -0.123 0.062 -0.105* 
Circuit D -0.185 0.048 -0.223** -0.185 0.048 -0.224** 
Betweenness    0.012 0.004 0.154** 
R2  0.363   0.384  
Change in R2  0.363**   0.021**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 8 
 
Closeness Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Policy and Procedure 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.463 0.044  0.706 0.129  
Member 0.255 0.039 0.336** 0.114 0.043 0.149** 
Circuit A -0.175 0.072 -0.127* -0.300 0.070 -0.217** 
Circuit B -0.419 0.053 -0.483** -0.437 0.050 -0.504** 
Circuit C -0.099 0.063 -0.085 -0.109 0.059 -0.094 
Circuit D -0.181 0.048 -0.219** -0.079 0.048 -0.096 
Closeness     0.016 0.003 0.365** 
R2  0.363   0.438  
Change in R2  0.363**   0.076**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 42 
Table 9 
All Centrality Measures as Predictors of Perceived Changes in Policy and Procedure 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.463 0.044  0.204 0.316  
Member 0.255 0.039 0.336** 0.106 0.044 0.139* 
Circuit A -0.175 0.072 -0.127* -0.305 0.075 -0.221** 
Circuit B -0.419 0.053 -0.483** -0.433 0.050 -0.499** 
Circuit C -0.099 0.063 -0.085 -0.080 0.061 -0.069 
Circuit D -0.181 0.048 -0.219** -0.039 0.052 -0.047 
Degree     -0.003 0.004 -0.135 
Betweenness     -0.009 0.006 -0.113 
Closeness     0.026 0.007 0.594** 
R2  0.363   0.447  
Change in R2  0.363**   0.084**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 10 
Degree Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Practice 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.451 0.044  1.414 0.043  
Member 0.254 0.038 0.341** 0.140 0.043 0.189** 
Circuit A -0.209 0.070 -0.155** -0.332 0.073 -0.245** 
Circuit B -0.396 0.052 -0.467** -0.400 0.050 -0.471** 
Circuit C -0.052 0.062 -0.046 -0.091 0.060 -0.080 
Circuit D -0.207 0.047 -0.256** -0.153 0.047 -0.190** 
Degree    0.006 0.001 0.298** 
R2  0.356   0.406  
Change in R2  0.356**   0.050**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 11 
Betweenness Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Practice 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.451 0.044  1.461 0.043  
Member 0.254 0.038 0.341** 0.219 0.039 0.294** 
Circuit A -0.209 0.070 -0.155** -0.228 0.070 -0.168** 
Circuit B -0.396 0.052 -0.467** -0.412 0.052 -0.486** 
Circuit C -0.052 0.062 -0.046 -0.074 0.062 -0.065 
Circuit D -0.207 0.047 -0.256** -0.207 0.047 -0.257** 
Betweenness    0.011 0.004 0.140** 
R2  0.356   0.373  
Change in R2  0.356**   0.017**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 12 
Closeness Centrality as Predictor of Perceived Changes in Practice 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.453 0.044  0.734 0.127  
Member 0.251 0.038 0.337** 0.116 0.042 0.157** 
Circuit A -0.209 0.071 -0.155** -0.327 0.069 -0.242** 
Circuit B -0.398 0.052 -0.469** -0.414 0.049 -0.489** 
Circuit C -0.053 0.062 -0.046 -0.063 0.058 -0.055 
Circuit D -0.204 0.048 -0.252** -0.107 0.048 -0.132* 
Closeness     0.015 0.003 0.355** 
R2  0.355   0.426  
Change in R2  0.355**   0.072**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 13 
All Centrality Measures as Predictors of Perceived Changes in Practice 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.453 0.044  0.267 0.311  
Member 0.251 0.038 0.337** 0.107 0.043 0.143* 
Circuit A -0.209 0.071 -0.155** -0.337 0.074 -0.250** 
Circuit B -0.398 0.052 -0.469** -0.408 0.050 -0.482** 
Circuit C -0.053 0.062 -0.046 -0.033 0.061 -0.029 
Circuit D -0.204 0.048 -0.252** -0.064 0.051 -0.079 
Degree     -0.002 0.004 -0.120 
Betweenness     -0.010 0.006 -0.132 
Closeness     0.025 0.007 0.588** 
R2  0.355   0.437  
Change in R2  0.355**   0.082**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 14 
Intercorrelations Between the Predictor and Criterion Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Member ___ .501 .296 .459 .466 .455 
2. Degree  ___ .749 .948 .415 .410 
3. Betweenness   ___ .711 .243 .233 
4. Closeness    ___ .409 .406 
5. Change in 
Policy 
    ___ .961 
6. Change in 
Practice 
     ___ 
Note. N = 296.
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Table 15 
Sector as Predictor of Degree Centrality 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 18.493 1.866  26.783 3.034  
Circuit A 20.275 3.751 0.311** 21.068 3.638 0.323** 
Circuit B -7.322 2.621 -0.179** -6.239 2.556 -0.152* 
Circuit C 3.692 3.278 0.067 4.316 3.188 0.078 
Circuit D -9.019 2.517 -0.232** -8.363 2.422 -0.215** 
Sector 7    10.530 7.375 0.076 
Sector 6    -4.451 3.835 -0.078 
Sector 5    -8.532 3.835 -0.149* 
Sector 4    -12.955 3.324 -0.300** 
Sector 3    -10.626 3.053 -0.296** 
Sector 2    -23.227 8.221 -0.151** 
R2  0.211   0.288  
Change in R2  0.211**   0.078**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 16 
Sector as Predictor of Betweenness Centrality 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 1.259 .568  5.074 0.909  
Circuit A 1.837 1.141 0.103 2.051 1.090 0.115 
Circuit B 0.099 0.797 0.009 0.478 0.766 0.043 
Circuit C 1.578 0.997 0.105 1.632 0.956 0.109 
Circuit D 0.006 0.766 0.001 0.302 0.726 0.029 
Sector 7    2.363 2.211 0.063 
Sector 6    -3.948 1.150 -0.253** 
Sector 5    -4.399 1.150 -0.281** 
Sector 4    -4.933 0.996 -0.418** 
Sector 3    -4.677 0.915 -0.477** 
Sector 2    -6.486 2.464 -0.154** 
R2  0.019   0.141  
Change in R2  0.019   0.122**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 17 
Sector as Predictor of Closeness Centrality 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 53.722 0.912  56.936 1.495  
Circuit A 8.027 1.834 0.253** 8.324 1.792 0.263** 
Circuit B -2.742 1.282 -0.138* -2.301 1.260 -0.116 
Circuit C -0.600 1.603 -0.022 -0.329 1.570 -0.012 
Circuit D -6.498 1.237 -0.342** -6.264 1.199 -0.329** 
Sector 7    6.093 3.633 0.091 
Sector 6    -0.801 1.889 -0.029 
Sector 5    -3.953 1.889 -0.142* 
Sector 4    -5.210 1.641 -0.246** 
Sector 3    -4.165 1.505 -0.238** 
Sector 2    -10.025 4.050 -0.134* 
R2  0.207   0.274  
Change in R2  .207**   0.067**  
Note. N = 296. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Figure 1 
 
Degree Centrality 
 
 
Note. Organization A has highest degree centrality. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Betweenness Centrality 
 
 
Note. Organization A has highest betweenness centrality. 
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Figure 3 
 
Closeness Centrality 
 
 
Note. Organization A has highest closeness centrality. 
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